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This policy brief summarises the main findings and lessons learned from research on corruption, social norms 
and behaviours in Uganda. The empirical evidence indicates that behavioural factors associated to social 
practices and collective understandings play a role in shaping Ugandan citizens’ attitudes towards petty 
corruption and in fuelling practices such as bribery and favouritism. On the basis of the research findings, policy 
recommendations are put forward aiming to contribute to the development of anti-corruption interventions that 
incorporate behavioural insights in their design and implementation.   
Introduction 
Petty corruption in its many forms is widespread in 
Uganda, resulting in the deficient delivery of essential 
public services. Despite a state-of-the-art legislative anti-
corruption framework, Uganda today is still ranked among 
the most corrupt countries in Africa according to the 
latest sources and most recent assessments (i.a. 2015 
Transparency International’s CPI, World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption indicator). Against this background, the 
perspective of incorporating behavioural approaches to 
promote anti-corruption outcomes has generated great 
interest.  
What distinguishes a behavioural perspective from 
conventional anti-corruption prescriptions is the 
recognition that people often do not make “rational” cost-
benefit decisions but are significantly influenced by social, 
cultural or other quasi-rational factors.  These may 
include mental shortcuts that trigger automatic 
responses, for example if there is a default assumption 
that corruption is the norm. Behavioural factors may also 
involve social and cultural expectations about the 
acceptability of corruption; or may entail resorting to 
corruption as a result of social pressures or as a means to 
solve problems of resource scarcity and deficient access 
to public services. 
Against this backdrop, the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) through its East Africa 
Research Fund (EARF) commissioned the Basel Institute 
on Governance to conduct qualitative research exploring 
the utility of a behavioural approach to tackling petty 
corruption, which in Uganda was conducted in 
collaboration with Makerere University. This policy brief 
extracts the main research findings and policy lessons 
learned for the case of Uganda as one of three East 
African countries under investigation.1  
Main Research Findings 
The research reveals strong evidence that behavioural 
drivers can play a significant role in fuelling and 
perpetuating practices associated with petty corruption in 
the Ugandan public sector. In particular, in the health and 
education sectors, the delivery of services tends to be 
informally regulated on the basis of practices of bribery, 
favouritism and gift-giving, which are embedded in and 
reinforced by social norms, values and collectively shared 
imaginaries and stereotypes (mental models).  
Social networks were found to be key in the research 
because they represent coping mechanisms that facilitate 
access to services and resources in a context of resource 
scarcity where formal salaries are often not enough to 
meet basic needs. Informal social networks start with 
family and close friends, but can extend to all forms of 
acquaintances and are often built instrumentally in order 
to include important individuals or ‘useful connections’ 
that can lend a hand in times of need.  
The social networks are efficient in pooling resources 
because they operate on the basis of widely recognised 
1 The other countries were Rwanda and Tanzania. For more detail, consult the comparative 
and country reports as well as the other two policy briefs associated to the project, 
accessible on www.baselgovernance.org/publications/. 
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social norms prescribing that individuals have an 
obligation to share resources and wealth with their group 
and a duty to reciprocate favours and gifts received. 
These social norms apply equally to public servants, 
which means that they are subject to pressures to use 
their positions to acquire resources on behalf of their 
family and to reciprocate gifts and favours received from 
friends and acquaintances. In this manner, social 
expectations fuel bribery and favouritism in the delivery of 
public services because providers need to fulfil the 
expectations of their networks but also because users 
proactively engage in bribery and gift giving as a means to 
co-opt service providers into their own networks. Under 
such circumstances, bribes are not dispensed as one-off 
transactions but rather as part of an on-going exchange in 
an economy of favours that explains why petty corruption 
has reached systemic levels.  
The rules and expectations associated to the social 
networks are strongly observed because they are 
enforced by means of considerations of social 
respectability and status, which point to the social 
acceptability of certain corrupt practices. Thus, the 
individual who acquires and shares wealth with his or her 
group is respected and beloved regardless of the source 
of the riches. In contrast, a law abiding individual who 
cannot afford to deliver benefits in the form and quantity 
expected from the network is subject to shaming, social 
isolation and even physical violence. However, an analysis 
of social network dynamics indicates that the 
admissibility of different behaviours is not constructed on 
a simple dichotomy between corrupt and non-corrupt but 
on the grounds of sociality and prevailing social norms 
that define what is socially just and reputable (see Box 1).  
 
However, in spite of their functionality in re-distributing 
resources and “getting things done”, the social networks 
also generate significant tensions. For instance, a 
“successful” provider, who delivers favours at reasonable 
rates, will get recommended across networks. While that 
may constitute a significant income supplement, it also 
drastically increases the numbers of clients who will 
expect and demand privileged treatment. The research 
findings encountered many accounts of providers who felt 
exceedingly overwhelmed by heavy workloads and 
pressure to deliver to their networks according to their 
expectations. 
 
Other behavioural drivers of petty corruption are rooted in 
automatic decision-making (through narrow frames) and 
prevailing mental models that justify and rationalise 
corrupt behaviour. In case of the former, when individuals 
expect corruption to be the normal state of affairs they 
automatically assume that every person they encounter 
will be corrupt. Corruption becomes a reference point 
that shapes expectations and decisions of service 
seekers in their interaction with public officials and 
service providers. Indeed, the research findings indicate 
that service users assume ‘the worst’ and often ‘come 
prepared’ to the service point by either collecting the 
money to pay a bribe in advance or by canvassing their 
networks in order to find a helpful acquaintance that can 
assist in facilitating the service.  
The research also found evidence of collectively held 
preconceptions – or mental models – that reinforce 
corrupt behaviours. In several instances research 
participants pointed to the association between the 
Ugandan national identity and corruption. For example, 
the phrase to “act like a Ugandan!” is frequently used to 
solicit a bribe. Such expressions invoke collectively held 
mental models about the normalcy of corruption and 
several research participants shared the expectation that, 
if given the opportunity, anyone would engage in corrupt 
behaviours. 
Box 1: What is corrupt? Social norms and social 
justice  
•  Social norms and values shape perceptions about respectability and 
status associated with the fulfilment of the duties of solidarity and 
reciprocity vis-à-vis one’s social networks.  
• Social justice is linked to a collective ‘public’ good, defined as an in-
group benefit. Only those pursuing a personal ‘private’ good, with 
disregard to the benefit of the group, are considered corrupt and 
greedy, and are therefore shamed and punished. 
• Thus, bribery that aims to collect money in order to share (e.g. to be 
used to pay for a nephew’s school fees, for a daughter’s wedding or a 
relative’s funeral) is rarely condemned, and may even be praised. 
However, bribery with the purpose of pure self-enrichment is strongly 
condemned. 
Box 2: Behavioural drivers of petty corruption in Uganda 
• The belief that corruption is the norm and everybody is corrupt makes 
decisions to bribe or seek social connections the default strategy to 
obtain access to public services.  
• Social network dynamics reproduce collective practices of petty 
corruption, such as bribery and favouritism, while fulfilling a crucial 
problem-solving function in a context where resources are scarce and 
service delivery is poor. 
• Two mental models, ‘Ugandanness’ associated with corruption and the 
cultural ideal of material wealth, are deeply engrained in the Ugandan 
social structure and not only justify and rationalise corruption but 
critically raise the propensity of ordinary Ugandans to engage in 
corrupt behaviours.  
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Policy Recommendations 
On the basis of the research findings, the following 
recommendations highlight the relevance of applying 
behavioural insights for practitioners:  
Testing behavioural approaches to anti-corruption. 
Developing interventions based on the evidence 
concerning behavioural drivers of corruption is a 
promising avenue for complementing conventional anti-
corruption approaches. Such behavioural interventions 
should be conceived to target and even harness the local 
context and understandings - including social norms and 
collective beliefs - which shape incentives, attitudes and 
expectations regarding corruption. Designing anti-
corruption behavioural interventions involves identifying 
shifts (or nudges) in the environment or in the information 
that is shared with individuals that will motivate decision-
making that supports better control of corruption 
outcomes.   
It should be underscored that, although a number of 
behavioural interventions have proven effective in 
experimental settings, the practice of incorporating 
behavioural considerations into policy making to improve 
macro level socio economic outcomes is still very much in 
a nascent stage. There are no blueprints to predicting 
what nudges people will respond to and in what way, 
which means that a) behavioural interventions should be 
rigorously piloted and assessed and b) practitioners 
should be ready to experiment and test different 
approaches to find those most effective in bringing about 
social change in a given context.  
 
Understanding the role of social norms and networks, and 
harnessing social network properties.  
Although social networks may prescribe and reproduce 
collective practices of petty corruption, it is likely that 
they can also be harnessed to promote positive anti-
corruption outcomes. Innovative behavioural anti-
corruption interventions would harness the power of 
social networks, which according to experimental 
evidence can help promote shifts in social norms. This 
can happen, for instance, by means of an induction or 
“peer effect” whereby an individual’s chances of adopting 
certain behaviours increase if the person has a friend or 
relative who has adopted the behaviours in	question.		
Network-driven interventions could harness intra-group 
interconnectedness by enlisting individuals who are 
prominent in their communities to become anti-corruption 
champions tasked with diffusing key information and 
promoting behavioural change vis-à-vis corruption. 
Information could be aimed at changing conventional 
wisdoms on corruption and promoting a better 
understanding of the detrimental effects of bribery and 
favouritism, even for those who at face value appear to 
benefit from such practices.  
 
Developing interventions that catalyse the power of 
information.  
The right use of information in corruption interventions 
may not only empower ordinary citizens but may also be 
effective in addressing narrow frames and in shifting 
mental models. This requires challenging the conventional 
wisdoms that normalise corruption by, for example, 
disseminating stories and illustrative examples of how 
corruption hurts individuals and families and by sharing 
contradicting notions that the corrupt are successful in 
life; as well as by de-linking the stereotype of Ugandan 
national identity being associated with corrupt 
behaviours. Also, storytelling, where positive role models 
are reinforced could shed light on the plight of positive 
deviants that pay a high price for not getting involved in 
corruption. While the research indicates that corrupt 
individuals are sometimes regarded as heroes because 
they seem to be doing well and are often recognised in 
many places including churches and public functions, 
anti-corruption champions need also to be profiled and 
exalted to counter the mental models associated with 
social status and success. 
 
Tackling conflictive normative constrains and the 
ambivalence of the networks.  
The research highlights how social pressure and 
expectations, entrenched in social norms and network 
dynamics, lead to often distressing and contradicting 
demands among Ugandan service providers. While, they 
are subjected to legal anti-corruption rules and their 
formal duties; they also feel obliged to give into their 
social networks’ expectation of favouritism and 
redistribution of rents and resources.  
• Develop and rigorously test pilot behavioural interventions that 
apply different nudges to elicit decision making that breaks habits 
of corruption.  
• Harnessing the transformative power of social networks can be 
pursued by identifying and engaging influential individuals in 
social networks to disseminate key messages and promote 
behavioural change.  
 
• ‘Edutainment’ and mass media campaigns constitute promising 
platforms for behavioural interventions to disseminate 
information that highlights the hidden costs of corruption beyond 
short-lived individual benefit and to debunk stereotypes that link 
success and respectability to wealth regardless of its source 
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The research shows that informal norms are strictly 
enforced through social controls, including punishments 
such as shaming. In contrast, formal legal frameworks 
often lack credibility and deterrence effects or are even 
perceived as partial and downright unfair. Interventions 
could reinforce the incentives of providers and members 
of social networks through schemes that reward honesty 
and compliance – rather than simply relying on ‘negative’ 
incentives such as monitoring and reporting.  
Recognising the functionality of corruption and 
acknowledging people’s pragmatism.  
The research findings highlight that practices of bribery 
and favouritism are often instrumental in solving problems 
of citizens who are trying to make ends meet. In a context 
where incomes are low and access to quality public 
services is problematic, the practices associated to the 
social networks constitute an informal safety net. This 
points to the fact that improving the quality and 
accessibility of public services is an indispensable 
requirement to address the practices of petty corruption 
that are widespread in Uganda. A reliable public safety 
net, whereby individuals can predictably realise their legal 
entitlements without recourse to informal strategies, 
would go a long way in ensuring the sustainability of any 





This document is an output from a project funded by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) through the 
Research for Evidence Division (RED) for the benefit of 
developing countries. However, the views expressed and 
information contained in it are not necessarily those of or 
endorsed by DFID, which can accept no responsibility for such 
views or information or for any reliance placed on them. 
The Basel Institute on Governance is an Associated Institute of the 
University of Basel. 
• Reshuffling the incentives of the service providers in a way that
responds to the conflicting normative directives they are
confronted with would entail a combination of making the threat
and risk of detection and punishment more likely and credible.
Introducing positive incentive schemes by means of which honest
behaviour is tangibly rewarded and therefore made relatively
more attractive to both service providers and the social networks
would give them incentives to act with integrity and honesty.
• Behavioural interventions can effectively complement institutional
and structural reform efforts aimed at improving the quality and
accessibility of public services. This would reduce the overall
benefits and raise the costs for individuals who are used to
securing services informally by resorting to petty corruption and
practices such as bribery, favouritism or gift-giving.
Lessons for Practitioners 
• Anti-corruption practitioners must recognise the functionality of
corruption in contexts of socio-economic and institutional
precariousness where individuals are driven by pragmatic incentives to
ease their lives. 
• Anti-corruption interventions must convey clear messages and use the
right type of information that debunks conventional wisdoms that
promote the acceptability of corrupt practices.
• Social networks play a pivotal role in the life of many Africans and are
inherently ambivalent and two-edged: on one side, they fulfil a crucial
function of pooling resources, on the other, they generate tensions
and pose conflicting demands to their members. Network properties
should be harnessed for favourable anti-corruption outcomes.
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